We use a residual-based cointegration test suggested by Gregory and Hansen (1992) that allows for the determination of a structural break in the cointegrating vector to test for the sustainability of Greek fiscal deficits over the period. This relatively recent test leads to a different result from that derived from standard Engle-Granger cointegration tests. The use of the conventional Engle-Granger test implies no cointegration between tax revenues and interestinclusive government expenditures. On the contrary, using the Gregory-Hansen test we conclude that tax revenues and interest-inclusive government expenditures are reintegrated and a structural break in the cointegrating vector took place in either 1981 or 1983. Our result of cointegration with a structural break is consistent with a strict interpretation of the government's intertemporal budget constraint since it implies a zero discounted value of the public debt. However, since the cointegration-regression slope parameter is significantly less than one (when tax revenues are regressed on expenditure), the undiscounted value of the public debt is different from zero. This means that the government has incentives to default on its debt and. therefore. Greek budget deficit policy is not sustainable.
Introduction
The existence of high and persistent fiscal deficits and the increasing debt to GDP ratio in the 1980s represent the major concern of policymakers in the Greek economy. The imbalances in the finances of the government are considered to be responsible for high interest rates and above EU-average inflation rates since the country joined the European Monetary System. The persistence of large fiscal deficits and the growing debt/GDP ratio has raised concern about the . sustainability of these deficits as well as the prospects of the country to join the last stage of Economic and Monetary Union by 1999.
Recently, the development of cointegration techniques has allowed researchers to test for the sustainability of fiscal deficits. In particular, the existence of large US fiscal deficits has prompted a series of articles that test whether the US government satisfies its intertemporal budget constraint [e.g. Hakkio and Rush (1991) , Haug (1991 Haug ( , 1995 , Tanner and Liu (1994) ]. The development of recent cointegration techniques that incorporate structural breaks in the tests for cointegration has allowed some authors to test for the existence of structural changes in the cointegrating vector of the involved variables that are primarily associated with election years or sharp changes in the stance of fiscal policy. In some cases, taking into account a structural break when testing for sustainability leads to a totally different conclusion. Tanner and Liu (1994) . for example, found that US fiscal deficits are sustainable when structural breaks in the cointegrating relationship are considered contrary to the result of Hakkio and Rush (1991) that was based on conventional residual-based cointegration tests.
This paper tests for the sustainability of Greek fiscal deficits using cointegrat'ion techniques that allow the statistical tests to determine the date of the structural break. The note is organized as follows: Section 2 presents a short overview of the theoretical background. Section 3 describes our econometric methodology and Section 4 our results. Finallv. Section 5 summarises our conclusions.
Theoretical Background
Consider the government's one-period budget constraint under the assumption that government bonds have a one-year maturity:
where Gt is government purchases of goods and services and transfer payments. Tt is government revenue, it is the annual interest rate and Bt is government debt at time t.
Equation (1) holds for each period. Using the budget constraints for each period and solving equation (1) forward leads to:
Equation (2) represents the government's intertemporal budget constraint. Solvency of the government implies that lim^^rc rn Bn -0. i.e.. to avoid Ponzi schemes where the government issues new debt to finance its deficit, the stock of government debt BO must equal the present value of primary budget surpluses Assuming that the interest rate it is stationary 1 . Hakkio and Rush (1991) transform equation (1) into an equation that has testable implications. This equation is of the form:
•t_ where GGt is government spending inclusive of interest payments on the debt (Hakkio and Rush 1991, p. 432 ).
For budget deficits to be sustainable, Tt and GGt must be cointegrated (i.e. e t must be stationary), provided they are non-stationary. However, b = 1 is not a necessary condition for the present value budget constraint to hold. As Hakkio and Rush (1991) show, the limit of the discounted value of the debt tends to zero and hence the intertemporal budget constraint holds if 0 < b < 1. However, a value of b less than one makes the limit of the undiscounted value of the debt unbounded and provides incentives for the government to default on its debt. Hence, cointegration of Tt and GGt would still imply unsustainable fiscal policy as long as b < 1.
In equation (3) above, a and 6 might vary over time due to structural changes in the cointegrating vector. This is more likely to happen when data cover a long-time span. In this paper, we use the Gregory-Hansen (1992) approach that tests for cointegration allowing for the statistical test to determine the date of the structural break. The use of this test represents the main innovation of our study. Our methodology is outlined in the following section. Gregory and Hansen (1992) have developed residual-based cointegration tests in models of regime shifts where the timing of the regime shift is not known a priori but is determined by the data. Gregory and Hansen consider four models of a regime shift depending on whether the shift affects the intercept or the slope, and whether a trend is included in the cointegrating regression. Here we consider a level shift model (model 2 in Gregory and Hansen) that takes the form To test for cointegration between yt and xt with structural change, i.e.. stationarity of ut in equation (4), Gregory and Hansen (1992) suggest the use of three tests. These tests are modifications of the test statistics Za and Zf (suggested by Phillips (1987) ) and the ADF statistic. These statistics are defined as:
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where Za , Zt (r) and ADF(r) correspond to the choice of change point r. The set T can be any compact subset of (0,1). Gregory and Hansen (1992) 
one régresser). Based on
Monte Carlo evidence for the model with structural break in the intercept, they also find that Z" has the largest power and Z" a the lowest power (see Table 5 in Gregory and Hansen (1992) ).
Estimation and Results
We use annual data from 1958 to 1992 on total government revenue and government spending inclusive of interest payments on debt. Figure 1 First, we test for stationarity of the individual time series. Table 1 includes the results of unit root tests on Tt and GGt. According to both r^ and rr statistics, the DF test cannot reject the null of a unit root. We use the DF instead of the ADF test since the residuals of the unit root regression are white. However, the results of Table 1 show that the first differences of the series are stationary.
Having established that tax revenue and government spending are 1(1). we test for cointegration between Tt and GGt using Engle-Granger's residual-based test and assuming no structural break. According to Table 2 . we cannot reject the null of no cointegration and therefore Greek fiscal deficits are not sustainable. However, this conclusion might be misleading if the long-run reintegrating relationship between Tt and GGt has shifted over time due to a structural change.
To test for cointegration in the presence of an unknown structural break we use the three tests suggested by Gregory and Hansen (1992) . Our results are given in Table 3 . The break points are determined by the test and are expressed in proportion of the sample size. According to Table 3, the statistics ADF" and Z* indicate a structural break in years 1983 and 1981 respectively. The inability of Z" a to reject the null of no cointegration with structural change can be attributed to the low power of this test.
We therefore estimate the cointegrating regressions that correspond to structural breaks in 1981 and 1983. The results are given in Table 4 . West-adjusted tstatistics given in parentheses 2 indicate that the intercept dummy is statistically different from zero and the cointegrating parameter (estimate of 6 in equation (3)) is statistically different from one. Since the estimated value of b is less than one, in accordance to our earlier discussion, the limit of the undiscounted value of the debt is infinite. This implies that the government might have incentives to default on its debt. This is especially so if revenue and government spending are measured relative to real GDP (or population).
Conclusions
This paper applies residual-based cointegration tests that allow for a regime shift for the insolvency of the Greek government sector. We obtain two major results: (1) The tests show that there has been a regime shift in either 1981 or 1983. These dates are consistent with the election of a Socialist government in 1981 and the accompanying large increases in government spending. Given the regime shift, government revenues and spending are cointegrated implying that the intertemporal budget constraint is. strictly speaking, satisfied. In other words, the discounted value of the debt is zero. (2) The estimated cointegrating parameter is less than one (0.963 and 0.950 when the regime shift «is in 1981 and 1983 respectively). This means that government spending is growing faster than government revenue. It also means that the undiscounted value of the debt is infinite.
Based on the second result, we conclude that the Greek budget deficits are 'too large' and. therefore, the policymakers have incentives to default on their debt through debt monetization or some other means. Our result should be interpreted with caution though since we have used the Gregory-Hansen (1992) asymptotic critical values in our test of hypothesis despite our relatively small sample. To establish how big is the small-sample bias one could use a Monte Carlo studv. Table 1A in Gregory and Hansen (1992) . (a) and (b) indicate significance at 1% and 10% respectively. The break points are given as percentages of the sample size. 14. 8GGO 1958 REU 1967 1976 1985 1992 
